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Abstract 
In order to understand the social, political and intellectual process of Chinese 
modernization, it is necessary to evaluate their ideological foundations and to thus become 
able to place it in the suitable political context. Chinese philosophy of the first half of the 
20th century was still determined by the conditions of the decline of the pre-modern era. 
The present article aims to explore and to introduce the rise and growth of Modern 
Confucianism, as well as some crucial philosophical elaborations in the field of the new 
moral philosophy, developed by the most well-known exponent of its so-called 2nd 
generation, Mou Zongsan.  
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Izvleček 
Če hočemo razumeti družbeni, politični in idejni proces kitajske modernizacije, moramo 
med drugim tudi dodobra spoznati njihove ideološke temelje in jih postaviti v ustrezni 
politični kontekst. V prvi polovici 20. stoletja je bila kitajska filozofija še vedno v veliki 
meri opredeljena s pogoji zatona predmodernega obdobja. Pričujoči članek raziskuje in 
predstavlja vzpon in padec rasti sodobnega konfucijanstva ter nekatere osrednje filozofske 
nadgradnje na področju nove moralne filozofije, ki jih je izdelal najbolj znani predstavnik 
tako imenovane druge generacije tega gibanja, Mou Zongsan.  
Ključne besede: sodobno konfucijanstvo, Mou Zongsan, nova moralna filozofija 
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1 Chinese Thought between Tradition and Modernity: the Birth of 
new Era and new Philosophy 
The principal aim of this article is the exploration and elucidation of the rise and 
growth of Modern Confucianism, as well as the introduction of some crucial 
philosophical elaborations in the field of the new moral philosophy by the most 
well-known exponent of its so-called 2nd generation, Mou Zongsan.  
In order to understand the social, political and intellectual context of his work, 
we shall begin with a brief survey of the political and social conditions and the 
main philosophical currents that defined the development of modern Chinese 
thought during the beginning of the modernization era.  
Chinese philosophy of the first half of the 20th Century was still determined 
by the conditions of the decline of the Chinese New Age. Almost all the theorists 
of this period were forced to deal with the ideas and contradictions imposed by the 
incomparably more advanced (technologically speaking) Western countries. While 
the radical “pro-Western intellectuals” (全盤西化派) engaged in the iconoclastic 
repudiation of all traditional culture and sought to resolve China’s crisis through 
the complete Westernization of Chinese society, the more “conservative 
intellectuals” ( 復 古 派 ) argued for a modernization of ancient, especially 
Confucian thought, which they believed provided the only possible spiritual basis 
for re-establishing an independent and sovereign Chinese state. However, 
ultimately the majority of the intelligentsia preferred to follow a middle course, 
focusing their efforts on a possible synthesis of both traditions. Based on their 
command of Western philosophy, they tried to reinterpret their own tradition 
through the most appropriate methods for integrating Western systems of thought 
into the framework of traditional Chinese discourses. During this period, which 
lasted approximately until the outbreak of WWII, Chinese philosophy was 
distinguished by two main currents:  
1) The first was characterised by a faith in progress and in the redemptive 
potential of reason and the natural sciences; in social terms it manifested itself in a 
wide range of liberal ideologies, while philosophically it tended towards the neo-
realistic and pragmatic discourses of the more recent American philosophical 
schools.  
2) The second current was instead distinguished by a comprehensive attempt 
to revitalize traditional (particularly Confucian and Neo-Confucian) thought by 
Jana S. ROŠKER: The Ideological Foudantions of Taiwanese Modernity 
102 
1 Chinese Thought between Tradition and Modernity: the Birth of 
new Era and new Philosophy 
The principal aim of this article is the exploration and elucidation of the rise and 
growth of Modern Confucianism, as well as the introduction of some crucial 
philosophical elaborations in the field of the new moral philosophy by the most 
well-known exponent of its so-called 2nd generation, Mou Zongsan.  
In order to understand the social, political and intellectual context of his work, 
we shall begin with a brief survey of the political and social conditions and the 
main philosophical currents that defined the development of modern Chinese 
thought during the beginning of the modernization era.  
Chinese philosophy of the first half of the 20th Century was still determined 
by the conditions of the decline of the Chinese New Age. Almost all the theorists 
of this period were forced to deal with the ideas and contradictions imposed by the 
incomparably more advanced (technologically speaking) Western countries. While 
the radical “pro-Western intellectuals” (全盤西化派) engaged in the iconoclastic 
repudiation of all traditional culture and sought to resolve China’s crisis through 
the complete Westernization of Chinese society, the more “conservative 
intellectuals” ( 復 古 派 ) argued for a modernization of ancient, especially 
Confucian thought, which they believed provided the only possible spiritual basis 
for re-establishing an independent and sovereign Chinese state. However, 
ultimately the majority of the intelligentsia preferred to follow a middle course, 
focusing their efforts on a possible synthesis of both traditions. Based on their 
command of Western philosophy, they tried to reinterpret their own tradition 
through the most appropriate methods for integrating Western systems of thought 
into the framework of traditional Chinese discourses. During this period, which 
lasted approximately until the outbreak of WWII, Chinese philosophy was 
distinguished by two main currents:  
1) The first was characterised by a faith in progress and in the redemptive 
potential of reason and the natural sciences; in social terms it manifested itself in a 
wide range of liberal ideologies, while philosophically it tended towards the neo-
realistic and pragmatic discourses of the more recent American philosophical 
schools.  
2) The second current was instead distinguished by a comprehensive attempt 
to revitalize traditional (particularly Confucian and Neo-Confucian) thought by 
Asian and African Studies XV, 2 (2011), pp. 101–122 
103 
means of new influences borrowed or derived from Western systems. In this 
search for synthesis, the spirit of German idealism was especially important, while 
certain approaches of the Viennese circle also attracted a number of exponents of 
this current. During the first twenty-five years of the People’s Republic this 
current, at least officially, was reduced to silence; however, their main concerns 
continued to be developed by Taiwanese theorists and, to a certain extent, also by 
those from Hong Kong. Over the last two decades, with the explosive economic 
liberalisation of the People’s Republic of China, this current had been gradually 
rehabilitated and its tendency to revitalize traditional thought, generally known as 
“Modern Confucianism” (xin ruxue 新儒學)1, still forms one of the mainstreams 
of contemporary Chinese theory.  
 
2 The Confucian Revival 
After representing the central state doctrine and ideological foundation of 
traditional Chinese society for two thousand years, beginning in the 19th century it 
became clear that Confucianism, at least in its orthodox traditional form, could no 
longer serve as an ideal basis for the further development of modern society. In the 
early 20th century, this criticism of Confucianism was best exemplified in the May 
4th Movement, which had both a nationalist aspect in its opposition to Japanese 
and Western imperialism, as well as a function of internal reform in its sweeping 
criticism of the ossification and deleterious effects of traditional state doctrine. 
However, this period also planted the seeds of so-called Modern Confucianism2, 
which arose as a critical attempt to revitalise and modernize this fundamental 
ancient tradition of thought. 
現代新儒家思潮是五四新文化運動後期出現的文化現象, 在中國現代思
想史上占有重要位置, 至今在海外華人世界以及港台地區仍有很大的影
響. 
                                                 
1 There are several different denotations of this current; I shall only name the two most common ones: 
xiandai xin ruxue 現代新儒學 (literal: Modern new Confucianism) and dangdai xin ruxue 當代新儒
學 (literal: Contemporary new Confucianism). 
2 The term Xin ruxue 新儒學 has sometimes been translated literally as “The New Confucianism” or 
as “Contemporary Confucianism” by some Western authors. To avoid confusing it with the 
traditional “School of Principles” (li xue 理學), generally denoted as Neo-Confucianism or New 
Confucianism in Western sources (including the present work), we shall omit the literal translation 
and apply the most frequently used term, Modern Confucianism.   
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The contemporary current of Modern Confucianism can be seen as a 
phenomenon which emerged during the last period of the May 4th Movement, 
which was striving for a cultural modernization. This current occupies an 
important position in the history of recent Chinese thought and still exercises 
considerable influence among the Chinese living abroad, as well as among 
those, living in Hong Kong and Taiwan. (Song 1991, 10) 
This primarily philosophical re-creation of the Confucian system of thought thus 
bore its first fruits in Hong Kong and Taiwan, to which the defeated Nationalist 
government fled after 1949. While the Chinese philosophers who lived and 
worked in Taiwan or Hong Kong after this date dealt much less with the 
sinification of Marxism and its semantic connotations, they were also forced to 
confront the issues of modernization and capitalism much earlier than their 
colleagues in mainland China. We are thus dealing with a current that had a 
continuous development from the early 19th century onwards, and was interrupted 
only by the upheavals of WWII and later by the Chinese Civil War.  
Most theorists focused their efforts on formulating the most appropriate, 
philosophically rooted criticisms of the autocratic ideologies and systems that 
prevailed in Taiwan during the first decades of the government in exile. In this 
regard, they were driven by the need to solve certain urgent problems of a practical 
nature in the spheres of politics, society, economy and culture. Thanks to the 
West’s support of Hong Kong, due to its semi-colonial status, and Taiwan, 
because it was seen (especially by the Americans) as a democratic alternative to 
Chinese communism, both areas began to undergo an explosive process of 
Westernization as early as the 1950s. This rapid integration into the world of 
Modern capitalism was (in the ideological sense) accompanied by traditional 
Confucian ethics based upon a hierarchical system of obedience to authority, 
which had already proven itself in Japan to be quite compatible with the demands 
and the often intolerable social conditions of early capitalism. 
In contrast to the People’s Republic, where until the 1980s3 Confucianism was 
regarded as the ideology of a superseded feudalism (Song 1991, 11), a number of 
intellectuals living in these societies (both of which were determined by post-
colonial discourses) began to oppose the increasingly dominant Westernization of 
                                                 
3 During the last two decades, in the PRC there has been an increasingly animated debate and a series 
of widening investigations into Modern Confucian philosophical approaches. An organisation named 
“The Research into the thought currents of contemporary Modern Confucianism” (xiandai xin rujia 
sichao yanjiu 現代新儒家思潮研究), which was founded in 1986 by two professors of philosophy, 
Fang Keli 方克立 and Li Jinquan 李錦全, is playing a particularly important role in this process. 
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their countries, and started looking mainly to the framework of Confucian thought 
for alternatives to these developments. 
 
3 The Declaration and the Second Generation of Modern Confucians 
Modern Confucians viewed modernization mainly as a rationalization of the world. 
As a discourse in which the “signposts” for a rehabilitation of traditionalism were 
most clearly expressed, Modern Confucianism can be considered as originating 
with the famous Declaration for a Renewed Valuation of Chinese Culture as a 
World Heritage (Wei Zhongguo wenhua jingzao shijie renshi xuanyan 為中國文
化敬告 世界人士宣言), which was published by a group of philosophers from 
Taiwan and Hong Kong, on January 1, 1958. The declaration included an anti-
communist panegyric of Western-style democracy and affirmed the importance of 
patriotism while preserving traditional values. In defining the goals and contents 
of Modern Confucianism, it represented the basic manifesto of this current. The 
key under signers of the declaration were Carsun Chang (Zhang Junmai 張君勱, 
1887–1969), Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995), Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909–1978) 
and Xu Fuguan 徐复觀  (1903–1982), who are still widely regarded as the 
founders of “Contemporary Modern Confucianism” (dangdai xin ruxue 當代新儒
學), understood as a system which provided a more systematic reinterpretation of 
traditional Chinese philosophy based on a profounder and more integral command 
of the foundations of Western, especially Platonic, Kantian and Hegelian, thought 
(Bunnin 2002, 11).  
In the declaration, the four authors expressed the ultimate goal of the new 
Confucian movement: 
The human existence as formed by Establishing Man as the Ultimate is that of 
a moral being which, at the same time, attains a higher spiritual 
enlightenment… Hence, this human existence is simultaneously moral and 
religious. Such a person is, in politics, the genuine citizen of democracy; in 
epistemology, one who stands over and above the physical world. Not being 
bound by his/her concepts, his/her intellectual knowledge does not contradict 
his/her spiritual apprehension (Declaration, cf, Bresciani 2001, 54)   
Actually, the authors and signers of the Declaration are most commonly viewed as 
the second generation of Modern Confucianists. The movement has been carried 
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by philosophers, who were functioning as the factual pioneers of the movement 
and are thus belonging to the so-called 1st generation of Modern Confucianism. 
They have been followed by the 2nd and even the 3rd generation, which consists 
of living and active philosophers, who mostly live in the USA (see the table 
bellow): 
 
FIRST GENERATION 
Liang Shuming  
梁漱溟 
(1893–1988) 
Xiong Shili 
熊十力 
(1885–1968) 
Zhang Junmai 
張君脈 
(1886–1969) 
Feng Youlan  
馮友蘭  
(1859–1990) 
He Lin 
賀麟  
(1902–1992) 
SECOND GENERATION  
Fang Dongmei  
方東美 
(1899–1977) 
Tang Junyi  
唐君毅 
(1909–1978) 
Xu Fuguan 
徐復觀 
(1903–1982) 
Mou Zongsan  
牟宗三 
(1909–1995) 
 
THIRD GENERATION  
Cheng 
Zhongying  
成中英 
(1935) 
Liu Shuxian  
劉述先 
(1934) 
Du Weiming  
杜維明 
(1940) 
Yu Yingshi  
于英時 
(1930) 
 
 
Table 1: Modern Confucianists. (Source: Bresciani 2001, 33–36) 
 
Mou Zongsan, who will be introduced a bit more in detail in the following 
sections, is widely considered as the most important exponent of the second 
generation. With the exception of Fang Dongmei, all the other scholars were 
disciples of Xiong Shili, who is considered to be one of the most crucial pioneers 
of the Modern Confucian thought. Their investigations have been based mostly on 
the supposition that Confucian thought could be completely amalgamated with the 
system of capitalistic development. Many of its proponents also believed that a 
renewed form of this traditional Chinese system of social, political and moral 
thought could serve as a basis for endowing modern life with ethical meaning and 
as a spiritual salve for the alienation which appeared as an undesirable side-effect 
of capitalist competition and profit-seeking. (Wang 1996, 63) Their efforts to 
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revitalize and reconstruct traditional Confucian thought can therefore be seen as an 
attempt to counter the dominant ideological trends and preserve Chinese cultural 
identity, while also contributing to the development of philosophical and 
theoretical dialogue between China and the West.  
 
4 The Ideal Foundations of the New World 
In order to achieve these aims, these philosophers mostly focused upon ontological 
problems which had been introduced by Western systems of thought, in the belief 
that questions related to the ultimate reality of the cosmos, the substance of being 
and the Absolute determined the meaning of life and were crucial to the 
establishment of a new system of values, compatible with current social conditions 
and the preservation of an integral cultural and personal identity. They thus looked 
to ontology as the philosophical discipline that would provide clear solutions to 
the problems they faced, beginning with that of Western modernization, and with 
the conviction that only through a genuine and clear comprehension of the cosmic 
substance would a modern man be able to find his spiritual home again. The 
crucial task, therefore, was to find the “proper” orientation, i.e. new, clearly 
marked signposts which pointed the way towards modern culture, while also 
providing basic criteria for solving practical problems in the sphere of politics and 
the economy. Without such a framework of orientations, society would slip into a 
generalized spiritual malaise, in which the actions of individuals would be 
determined by the purely mechanistic laws of technocratic utility. In this case, the 
comprehension of Western thought for the purposes of finding spiritual guidelines 
for the modernization in course would necessarily remain fragmentary, incoherent 
and superficial, and would therefore not only be incapable of enriching the 
Chinese spiritual world, but would actually accelerate the processes of spiritual 
disorder and alienation. 
The focus upon ontological questions can thus be seen as a specific reaction of 
traditional Chinese philosophy to modernization.  
Most of the modern Chinese philosophers from the P.R. China were following 
the presumption, according to which Indian and Western philosophy both speak of 
the noumenon as something more real (than the phenomenon) and think that the 
phenomenon is delusion while the noumenon is reality. This conception of reality 
has never emerged in Confucianism or any other classical Chinese philosophical 
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discourse. Chinese philosophers recognized the distinction between the root and 
things. It rests not with the distinction between reality and delusion, but with the 
distinction between root and branches, between headstream and offshoots. 
Ordinary things are all real, and it is not the case that only the root is real. Hence, 
traditional Chinese philosophers did not hold any theory that treats the noumenon 
as the only reality (Cheng 2002, 240). 
According to Modern Confucian interpretations, however, classical 
Confucianism saw “Heaven” or “Nature” (tian 天) as the ultimate noumenon, 
which was transcendental and represented the elementary entity, creating and 
changing everything that exists. The Modern Confucian Heaven was also 
immanent; it presented human beings with “nature” (xing 性 ), essentially 
determined by the elementary Confucian virtue of “humanity” (ren 仁). However, 
in their interpretations of traditional systems, the Modern Confucians went a step 
further: in their discourses, human nature became that potential which not only 
formed the moral or spiritual Self, but simultaneously also transcended the 
individual’s empirical and physiological characteristics. By acting in accordance 
with humanity, man could experience the unification with “Heaven/Nature” (tian 
ren heyi 天人合一), and thus comprehend the genuine meaning and value of his 
existence.  
It has been the Confucian orthodoxy that moral ideas, cosmological insights, 
and ontological claims cannot be separated. It is an atypical Confucian belief that 
how a person should be is inherently related to how the world really is, and that 
only a person living according to what the world really is can be a good person 
(Yu 2002, 144) 
In contrast to the prevailing modern Western philosophy, they maintained that 
original reality can be comprehended. Most of them followed the presumption that 
we cannot regard truth as something outside of our mind, waiting for us to explore, 
but that we must study ontology through understanding the human nature. 
Through such an introspective view, human beings could realize that original 
reality is in each of us, and that they cannot seek to know it in external things 
through reasoning. Thus, they should turn inward and let original reality present 
itself. In this way, the Modern Confucianists synthesized several main doctrines of 
Confucianism and integrated them into a coherent system in order to show that the 
cultivation of virtue has an ontological and cosmological foundation. 
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On a more general level, at the turn of the new millennium, the modern 
Confucian movement underwent a rapid and radical transformation, a change in 
method, in metaphysical outlook, and in the plans for its practical realization in the 
spheres of society and interhuman relationships (Bresciani 2001, 31).  
 
5  Mou Zongsan: His Life and His Work 
In the present section, we shall provide a brief introduction to the theoretical 
system of Mou Zongsan 牟宗三  (1909–1995), the most famous Taiwanese 
philosopher of the latter half of the 20th century and generally regarded as the 
chief exponent and spiritual father of this new current. He was one of the first and 
best known advocates for the revitalization of traditional Chinese (especially 
Confucian) thought in modern times. He was born in Shandong 山東 province and 
studied at Peking University (Beijing daxue 北京大學) where he was, as already 
mentioned, one of the three “most gifted students” (Tang 2002, 327) of the 
founder of Modern Confucianism, Xiong Shili 熊十力. 
Mou reached the highest level of intellectual achievement. He was widely 
read and had a deep understanding of both Chinese and Western philosophy. 
His extensive learning provided a unique vantage point from which to 
compare Chinese and Western thought. His new Confucianism not only 
established a complete system of Chinese philosophy, but also provided the 
basis for the critical assessment of Western philosophy. (Tang 2002, 327–328)   
Xiong’s other two “most gifted students”, Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1909–1978) and 
Xu Fuguan 徐复觀 (1903–1982) are also considered to be founders of the Second 
generation of Modern Confucianism.  
While being still a student, Mou published his first important work, entitled 
Researches into the School of Mystery and Chinese Moral Philosophy in the Light 
of the Book of Changes (Cong ZhouYi fangmianyamjiu Zhongguo zhi xuanxue yu 
dao zhexue 從周易方面研究中國之玄學與道哲學). This study represents an 
attempt to analyze traditional Chinese thought of the period of the Six Dynasties 
(六朝 , 222–589) from the perspective of Western categorical premises and 
concepts. As a consequence of his intensifying focus on traditional Chinese 
philosophy, Mou would change his methodological approaches later on, while in 
his more mature investigations he tried to proceed from specific traditional 
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Chinese methodologies, which he epitomized in his work: Special Features of 
Chinese Philosophy (Zhongguo zhexuede tezhi 中國哲學的特質). 
Although their professor, Xiong Shili, decided to remain in Peking after the 
establishment of the PRC in 1949, all three of his students escaped to Hong Kong 
and Taiwan where they lived under the patronage of the exiled guomin dang 
government. In the first phase of his academic work, Mou dealt mainly with logic 
and the theory of knowledge, and published the results of his inquiries in The 
Models of Logic (Luoji dianfan 邏輯典範) and A Critique of Comprehensive Mind 
(Renshi xinde pipan 認識心的批判). In these works, one can clearly sense the 
impact of Whitehead’s and Wittgenstein’s philosophy, though of Western 
philosophers it was Immanuel Kant who most influenced Mou Zongsan’s 
intellectual development. In spite of his admiration of Kant, Mou developed his 
own thought through the criticism of Kantian claims. His philosophy of moral 
metaphysics focused on human beings as moral subjects who, unlike Kantian 
selves, took part in infinite mind with a world-creating capacity for intellectual 
intuition. (Bunnin 2002, 13) 
During the 1950’s, he focused increasingly upon classical Chinese philosophy, 
studying not only Confucianism, but also Daoist and especially Buddhist 
philosophy, with particular attention to their epistemological approaches. He 
elaborated these studies of traditional Chinese thought during his tenure at the 
Chinese University in Hong Kong (Xianggang Zhongwen daxue 香港中文大學), 
where he taught until the mid-70s. The books Mind and Nature (Xinti yu xingti 心
體與性體), Talent and Rationality of Mystery (Caixing yu xuanli 才性與玄理) 
and Buddha’s Nature and Prayna (Fuoxing yu banruo 佛性與般若) are among his 
most important works from this period. In the mid-1970s he published his most 
important epistemological work, in which he examined the quality and functions 
of human perceptive potential according to his understanding of the Chinese 
epistemological tradition. This work, entitled Mental Intuition and Chinese 
Philosophy (Zhide zhijue yu Zhongguo zhexue 智的直覺與中國哲學), together 
with his work On Summum Bonum (Yuanshan lun 圓善論), which appeared ten 
years later and summarized his moral metaphysics, contains the basic framework 
of Mou’s own philosophical system. At the end of the 1970s he also resumed his 
reinterpretation and revision of Kant’s philosophy under the title Phenomena and 
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things as such (Phenomena and noumenon) (Xianxiang yu wu zishen 現象與物自
身). 
From his retirement in 1974 until his death twenty-one years later, Mou 
Zongsan remained an extraordinarily active philosopher and a very productive 
writer, researcher and teacher.  
60 歲以後...是牟宗三智慧圓融集大成階段. 這一 時期, 他尤其關注中西哲
學, 尤其是儒家哲學與康德哲學的融匯, 從而在對康德哲學的消化吸收中, 
重建儒家的道德形而上學. 
The period of Mou Zongsan’s intellectual maturity began at the age of 60, and 
resulted in important theoretical syntheses. During this period, he devoted 
most of his attention to questions of Chinese and Western philosophy, being 
especially interested in a fusion of Confucian and Kantian thought. Thus, in 
the process of accepting and modifying Kant’s philosophy, he managed to 
reconstruct Confucian moral metaphysics. (Wang 1996, 57)   
Today, Mou Zongsan is still highly regarded by both Chinese and Western 
scholars, and as one of the founders and main representatives of Modern 
Confucianism is considered to be one of the most important Chinese philosophers 
of the 20th century. 
 
6  Mou’s Crucial Sources 
Over the course of his intellectual and academic development, Mou focused 
increasingly upon the ancient Chinese tradition. Based on his solid command of 
Western discourses and an intercultural understanding of Kantian philosophy, he 
reinterpreted and updated a number of central concepts of Daoist, Confucian and 
Buddhist philosophy, of which he considered the latter to be one of the highest 
achievements in the history of thought. He saw Buddhism as a “very contentful 
and complicated” doctrine. He held that Buddhist philosophy was “the most 
illuminating and has opened up the newest states of reason and involved the most 
levels”. 
Mou believed that Daoism was also an important current of ancient Chinese 
thought, although he mainly saw it as a kind of bridge towards a better 
understanding of Buddhist philosophy. In traditional Chinese thought, however, 
his preference went to Confucianism, particularly the Neo-Confucian system of 
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the Song (宋 960–1279) and Ming (明 1386–1644) dynasties. Of the three main 
doctrines, Mou considered Confucianism to be the mainstream of Chinese 
philosophy because the structure of its thought originated in China and because it 
was primarily concerned with moral consciousness. (Tang 2002, 330) 
The emphasis on ethical problems, which was typical of Modern 
Confucianism, was also present throughout all of Mou Zongsan’s work. Mou 
pointed out, however, that moral philosophy was not the only priority of ancient 
Chinese thought. In his view, all three central philosophical discourses of the 
Chinese classics belong to vertical systems (Mou 1983, 103), and each dealt with 
metaphysics in its own way. Here, too, he saw Confucianism as the current which 
had contributed most to the formation of related, specific Chinese discourses. He 
explicitly rejected the claim that Confucianism is concerned only with morality 
and has nothing to do with existence. According to Mou, Confucian morality 
implies a moral metaphysics, that is, a metaphysics based on morality. (Mou 1983, 
330–331) 
Contrary to current views of Confucianism as authoritarian, Mou argued 
convincingly that moral autonomy was implicit in Confucian philosophy. But 
even Kant was inadequate in this regard. Limited by his Christian background, 
Kant could treat free will only as a postulate of practical reason, the other two 
postulates being the immortality of the soul and the existence of God. He 
could therefore only establish a metaphysics of morals, at best a moral 
theology, but never a moral metaphysics. Mou felt that Chinese tradition went 
further than Kant in this respect. (Liu 2003, 484) 
 
7 Elaborations and Developments of Traditional Confucianism 
In his view, the Confucian comprehension of being arose mainly from the concept 
of Heaven/Nature (天):  
通過哪個概念可以透射到存在呢? 就是 “天” 這個概念. 
Which concept can lead us to break through existence? It is the concept of 
“Nature”. (Mou 1970, 75) 
According to Mou, the basic feature of the Confucian worldview was its focus on 
positive aspects of human life, and the fact that it proceeded from the concept of 
the subject. He doubtless saw this positive approach in the repeated Confucian 
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negation of mystical and rationally incomprehensible aspects of life, which also 
explained why all of Confucian metaphysics was imbued with the problem of 
morality. In this discourse, ethics and ethical implications transcended the world of 
strictly mechanistically structured pragmatics. The search for possible ways to 
endow existence with ethical meaning, which in Western philosophies was most 
often seen as belonging to the domain of religious studies, remained very much a 
problem for the rationality of metaphysics in the context of Confucian thought. 
From a Western perspective, this somehow shifted the boundary between the 
philosophical and religious ethics that were specifically expressed in Confucian 
and Neo-Confucian discourses of subjectivity and social nature, something which 
is also reflected in Mou Zongsan’s philosophy: 
To many Western philosophers, Mou’s system seems to be a religious faith 
rather than a philosophy [...]. Although Mou specifically denied that he was a 
theologian, he was conscious of the religious aspects of Confucianism, and 
argued for their acceptance. Nevertheless, Mou believed that Confucian 
thought qualified as a philosophical doctrine. (Tang 2002, 340)    
The second specific feature of Confucianism, which was likewise based upon 
subjectivity, was also closely connected to morality and ethics.  
儒家主要的就是主體, 客體是通過主體而收攝進來的, 主體透射到客體而
且攝客歸主. 所以儒家即使是講形而上學, 它也是基於道德. 
The Confucians took their departure mainly from the subject. The object was 
established by assimilation through the subject. The transmission of the 
subject assimilates the object and returns into the subject. Even when 
Confucians talked about metaphysics, they therefore referred to a metaphysics 
based upon morality. (Mou 1971, 79)  
The central Confucian virtue of “humanity” (仁) thus also belonged to the sphere 
of subjectivity. 
儒家經典中代表全體的觀念比如孔子講仁, 仁就是代表主體... 仁也是
心. 
A concept which represents entirety within Confucianism is the concept of 
humanity, as explained by Confucius. Humanity represents the subject. It also 
represents the mind. (Mou 1971, 79) 
But this does not refer to the subjectivity of a subject in the common sense, but 
concerns his concept of objective subjectivity (Mou 1971, 79) in the sense of a 
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social (political) being. This objective subjectivity, which he thus identified with 
the traditional concept ren, Mou denoted by the term “the real subjectivity” 
(zhenshide zhutixing 真實的主體性), (Mou 1971, 80): 
這個真實的主體性不是平常我們說的主觀的主體, 這是客觀的主體, 人
人都是如此, 聖人也和我一樣.  
This real subjectivity is not to be equated with the subjective subjectivity we 
generally talk about. This is an objective subjectivity of all people, of sages as 
well as of ourselves (common people).4 (Mou 1971, 80) 
 
8 Daoist and Buddhist Approaches  
His investigations into Daoist philosophy were especially important for his 
redefinition of the concept of “absence” (無), which in both China and the West 
has been generally and acritically equated with the Western idea of nothingness 
and non-existence: 
無沒有存有論的意味, 但當 '無' 之智慧徹底發展出來時, 也可以函有
一個存有論, 那就不是西方為標準的存有論, 而是屬於實踐的 
(practical), 叫實踐的存有論. 
Absence is not of an ontological nature; but once the wisdom concerning it is 
complete, it can also imply ontology. But this is not an ontology of the 
Western type; it is an ontology which has been defined by practise, and which 
can therefore be called “practical ontology”. (Mou 1971, 93) 
According to Mou, “nothingness” is not an ontological concept, but a practical 
concept which ultimately means letting things be. Mou concurred that letting 
things take their own course through a mental state of “emptiness and with no 
attachment” was great wisdom. Thus, Daoist metaphysics is based on a practical 
concept of “nothingness”. In this sense, Daoism has a “practical ontology” or 
“practical metaphysics.” (Tang 2002, 331) Analogously, the Daoist concept you 
(有) can in no way be equated with being or existence, since it expresses a mental 
orientation:  
                                                 
4 This refers to the famous statement by Mencius: “凡同類者, 舉相似也, 何獨至於人而疑之, 聖人
與我同類者” (“All things that belong to the same kind are similar. Why do we start doubting this 
when it comes to men? The saint and I are of the same kind”). (Mengzi 2011. XI, Gaozi shang, 151) 
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“Being” is not taking something to put into empty “nothingness”; it is the 
directing of mental states. And with “nothingness” and “being”, we can 
understand “dao”. (Tang 2002, 331)  
In his Buddhist studies, Mou mainly concentrated on the notion of “empty mind” 
(kongxin 空心). This is a cognitive construct of a transcendental mind without any 
possessiveness, attachments or obsessions. Mou found corresponding ideas in 
Daoist (the “way of mind” dioxin 道心) and Confucian (“original mind” benxin 本
心) discourses. For him, these three notions represent different forms or different 
names for the “infinite (or limitless) mind” (wuxiande zhixin 無限的智心), (Mou 
1971, 237) While this pure, original and boundless mind is an innate attribute, 
possessed by all people, he believed that most people were, unfortunately, unable 
to preserve it. Those who succeeded in doing so were becoming “sages” (shengren 
聖人) or Buddhas. Reaching this stage was very desirable, for the enlightened not 
only possessed many mental privileges and advantages, such as wisdom, 
cheerfulness, mental (and often also physical) invulnerability or insensitivity to 
pain, but were also equipped with a perfect, or infallible apparatus for perception, 
the so-called “mentally direct perception” or “mental intuition” (zhide zhijue 智的
直覺 ), which not only comprehended appearances, but also recognized and 
understood both things in themselves and substance. Mental intuition was, 
therefore, not only an instrument for understanding the world and our position in it, 
but also a divine quality that created both. Hence, according to Mou, the 
quintessence of Chinese philosophy is in its metaphysics. These metaphysics 
views human beings as moral subjects who have the capacity for intellectual 
intuition5 that creates the world. (Mou 1971, 332) 
The above mentioned problems, regarding the direct perception, are important 
not only in respect to epistemology, but also in the methodological sense. 
重建中國哲學的努力始終關涉著哲學方法論的探討. 牟宗三的智的直覺
理論無疑是這種努力的自覺表現. 
The endeavours for a reconstruction of Chinese philosophy have always been 
connected to the research in philosophic methodology. Mou Zongsan’s theory 
                                                 
5 Mou’s term zhide zhijue 智的直覺 is generally translated in English with the phrase “intellectual 
intuition”. This translation is inadequate, however, for with this term Mou wished to express a kind 
of “direct perception” (zhijue 直覺), which is not limited only to the cognitive (or intellectual) 
aspects of comprehension, but also includes emotions, feelings, sensations, experiences, inclinations, 
interests, memories and, above all, the potential for moral and ethical valuation.   
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of mental intuition is doubtless representing a wilful expression of such 
endeavours. (Gong 2002, 42)  
 
9 Mou and Kant: the Crossroads to New Understandings 
Like most other Taiwanese and Hong Kong philosophers, Mou Zongsan also tried 
to find a framework for the revitalisation of traditional Chinese theories in 
Western methodologies and by applying Western categorical structures. In this 
regard, he followed Kantian theoretical approaches, which he found to be 
culturally closer to his own tradition than any other European discourse. Mou saw 
Kant’s philosophy as the only philosophy that can engage in dialogue with 
Chinese philosophy. (Tang 2002, 332)   
While Mou accepted Kant’s ontological division of the world (in the Critique 
of the Pure Reason) into the spheres of appearances (phenomena) and of substance 
(noumenon), he differed from the German philosopher regarding human 
perceptive potential. Kant argued that human beings could only comprehend 
appearances because the senses were too limited to also comprehend things as 
such; these were identical with substance and comprehensible only through pure 
reason and thus solely by God.   
Based on the assumption that morality was the basic quality of human beings, 
Mou accepted Kant’s concept of the categorical imperative, but replaced the 
category of free will, which had served Kant as the basis for acting in accordance 
with this imperative, with the category of infinite mind. For him, free will as the 
source of the categorical imperative must be only a cause, and not an effect. It can 
limit other principles, but cannot be limited by them. (Tang 2002, 333) 
Infinite mind, which can be found under various names6 in most traditional 
Chinese philosophical discourses, according to Mou is the transcendental 
foundation of moral behaviour and is itself absolutely and infinitely universal. 
Thus, for human beings to be moral beings, in the Kantian sense, means they 
                                                 
6 Among these we can mention the Buddhist terms “empty mind” (kong xin 空心) or “Buddha’s 
mind” (fo xin 佛心), the Daoist “Way of mind” (dao xin 道心), as well as the Confucian notion 
“original mind” (ben xin 本心) and the Neo-Confucian concept of “innate knowledge” (liang zhi 良
知), etc. 
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cannot issue unlimited imperatives, and the categorical imperative as the basis of 
morality is impossible. (Tang 2002, 333) 
Mou went a step further by presupposing that human infinite mind possessed 
divine qualities, or, in still more radical terms, human infinite mind had to be 
necessarily equal to the divine mind, given that the simultaneous existence of two 
different, infinite and absolute substances was not possible. Kant had ascribed the 
ability to recognize things as such (noumenon) to God and to the divine mind, 
while human comprehension was limited only to the recognition of appearances 
(phenomena). Mou denoted this general human comprehension with the term 
“direct sensual perception” or “sensual intuition” (ganchu zhijue 感觸直覺 ). 
However, because unlike Kant he acknowledged no boundary between divine and 
human mind, he concluded that human mind also had to imply a potential of direct 
mental perception or “mental intuition” (zhide zhijue 智的直覺)7. 
牟宗三認為, 人作為理性存在者不僅具有智的直覺, 而且形上問題就是以
智的直覺為基礎而建立的; 否定智的直覺, '不但全部中國哲學不可能, 即
康德本人所講的全部道德哲學亦全成空話.  
Mou Zongsan argued, that men as rational beings do possess mental intuition. 
But that is not all: besides, mental intuition, according to him, was also a basis 
of any metaphysical questions. If we would neglect mental intuition, than the 
entire Chinese philosophy would not be possible at all and the same also held 
true for the entire moral philosophy, as explained by Kant––in that case it 
would also be regarded only as idle talk. (Gong 2002, 42) 
 
10 Direct Mental Perception or Mental Intuition 
Although mental intuition is not a kind of sensual perception, it is also not only a 
cognitive comprehension. Thus, mental intuition is not a discursive one (Mou 
1971, 191) and can therefore not be based upon concepts. Its function, however, is 
not only a perceptive, but also creative one.  
                                                 
7 Originally, Mou actually applied the term zhijue 直覺, which is generally translated with the 
somewhat misleading expression “intuition”, as a translation of Kant’s notion Anschauung (Gong 
2002, 43). But in Mou’s philosophy, this expression only refers to epistemology in a narrow sense 
(i.e. as a “theory of perception”). To express this idea in Chinese, it would be more correct to use the 
word zhiguan 直觀 (lit.: “direct observation”), since the term zhijue 直覺 (lit.: “direct perception”) 
mainly refers to comprehension in a broader sense, or to an epistemology which also implies ethics, 
art, religion etc. (Gong 2002, 43) 
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智的直覺自身就能把他的對象給我們, 直覺活動自身就能實現存在, 直覺
之即實現之, 此是智的直覺之創造性.  
Mental intuition as such can transmit objects to us. Its activities as such can 
realize existence, for intuitive perception of objects is at the same time their 
realisation; that is the creativity of mental intuition. (Mou 1971, 191)  
Mental intuition could not, therefore, be completely equated with rational 
comprehension; despite similarities, this form of direct perception differed in 
various respects from theoretical rationality, and also from Kant’s concept of 
practical reason. While Mou’s “mentality” (or “intellect”) (zhi 智 ) is “moral 
reason” (daode lixing 道德理性), it differs from Kant’s principle of moral reason, 
which was determined by pure form. According to Kant, this formalized principle 
was both the driving force and the duty of moral subjects. This principle thus 
manifests itself as an external force which is not identical with the Self, but 
functions as a kind of moral pressure. According to Mou, however, the greater this 
pressure, the less the possibility of genuine moral action: 
牟宗三對康德的批評恰恰是圍繞著自律道德而展開的. 他認為自律道德
現實基礎與現實動力是主體內在質料因素如愛好, 興趣, 情感等. 這些質
料因素可以將超越的形式法則 “應該作” 內在化, 從而與主體的具體存在
結合起來. 這種結合使道 德法則充實起來, 也消除了它與主體對立的性質, 
異己的力量 成為 “自己的” 內在需要.  
Mou Zongsan’s criticism of Kant was focused precisely upon autonomous 
morality. Mou believed that the real foundations and motivations of 
autonomous morality were qualities inherent to the subject, such as 
inclinations, interests, feeling etc. These qualities had the ability to integrate 
the transcendental formal principle, which manifested itself in duties, i.e. in 
the need to do something. Therefore, he could unify them with the concrete 
existence of the subject. This unification caused the fulfilment of the moral 
principle and removed the mutual contradiction between this principle and the 
subject. This power, which was originally separate and different from the Self, 
thus became ones own, innate need. (Gong 2002, 44) 
The moral and values system also provided Mou with the means for defining the 
existence of mental intuition. In this respect, he was following Kant’s assumption 
that the world of appearances (phenomena) could be revealed to us through direct 
sensory perception (or intuition), while the world (i.e. the world of concrete 
actuality, in which we live) could be managed and controlled by us through 
“knowledge” (zhixing 知性) and “reason” (lixing 理性). But the world of values, 
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The moral and values system also provided Mou with the means for defining the 
existence of mental intuition. In this respect, he was following Kant’s assumption 
that the world of appearances (phenomena) could be revealed to us through direct 
sensory perception (or intuition), while the world (i.e. the world of concrete 
actuality, in which we live) could be managed and controlled by us through 
“knowledge” (zhixing 知性) and “reason” (lixing 理性). But the world of values, 
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which Mou identified with the substance of being, and which also represented the 
foundation of knowledge, reason and the world of appearances as such, could not 
be revealed to us through sensory perception. But because concrete actuality could 
not exist without values, and human beings could not live and act within that 
reality without knowledge and reason, we must also possess a method for 
recognizing the essence of values and substance as such.  
這個問題, 在牟宗三看來, 是以康德為代表的西方式理路所無法解決的. 
因為, 他的出發點已經決定了問題的答案, 即他從純粹知識論的立場出發, 
并以此為標準來看待價值問題, 結果價值問題弄成了無意義的問題. 要解
決這個問題, 必須從 “道德進路” 出發, 承認智的直覺的存在以把握價值存
在.  
According to Mou Zongsan, Western discourses, with Kant in the lead, could 
not solve this problem, because their basic paradigms already defined the 
answer they would ultimately arrive at. Because they originated in pure 
epistemology, and applied it as a criterion for treating values, the problem of 
values as such had lost all meaning or significance for them. If we truly want 
to solve this problem, we must follow moral assumptions; if we want to 
master the existence of values, we must first acknowledge the existence of 
mental intuition. (Gong 2002, 44) 
 
11 Is Ultimate Happines Possible? An Experimantal Conclusion 
In his work On the summum bonum (Yuan shan lun 圓善論), Mou also departs 
from Kant’s moral philosophy, in which the entities of happiness and goodness 
(summum bonum; yuan shan 圓善) were not possible in our imperfect concrete 
world and could only be incorporated in the perfect world of God. In this context, 
Mou stressed the value and contribution of philosophical pragmatism, which 
determined traditional Chinese, especially Confucian thought. This thought 
focused upon the concrete world of human actualities, the here and now, in which 
there was no need to escape into other, supernatural worlds. And while Chinese 
philosophy was likewise incapable of solving Kant's problem of the summum 
bonum, Mou showed the equivocal way in which this problem was posed by 
Western, especially Kantian philosophy.  
The Chinese know only too well that in real life, happiness and the good 
rarely go together. But the Chinese do not need to look to an otherworldly 
kingdom of God. No matter what happens in our lives and no matter how 
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imperfect the earthly world is, we can always find fulfillment in this world... 
Consequently, we can always find fulfillment in non-fulfillment; the summum 
bonum is realized here and now; and there is no need to look for a kingdom of 
God in the other world. (Liu 2003, 485)    
Critics of Mou’s theory reproached him with placing an exaggerated emphasis 
upon the moral aspects of ancient Chinese thought and philosophy in general.  
“智的直覺” 並沒有成為中國哲學的基石. 中國哲學中確實有一個重視直
覺的傳統, ... 然而這些直覺即有宗教型 (禪宗), 又有知識型 (朱熹), 如何能
以道德直覺概括它們呢?  
“Mental intuition” was by no means a cornerstone of Chinese philosophy. 
Although traditions emphasizing intuition did exist in Chinese philosophy, 
[…] they were usually expressed either in religious (as for instance in Chan 
Buddhism) or in epistemological (for example in Zhu Xi) terms; hence, how 
could they be summarized by any concept of moral intuition? (Gong 2002, 46) 
A similar concept of mental intuition would also logically and necessarily be 
connected to reasoning. According to this critical assumption, the existence of the 
concept of mental intuition had necessarily to be defined as a structural part of 
human cognition: 
牟宗三將智的直覺與一切思的活動都對立起來, 最終只能走向神秘主義. 
以此作為中國哲學的基石無疑 是其主觀的臆斷. 
Mou Zongsan sees mental intuition as being in contradiction to any kind of 
cognitive activity and thus ultimately wades into mysticism. The assumption 
that it represents a cornerstone of Chinese philosophy is undoubtedly his own 
subjective surmise. (Gong 2002, 46) 
Because Mou used basic epistemological categories of Western thought in his 
attempt to resolve the philosophical problem of recognizing substance through the 
concept of mental intuition, which doubtlessly belongs to the traditional concepts 
of ancient Chinese philosophy, his philosophy could be defined as an attempt to 
synthesize Western (particularly Kantian) and traditional Chinese thought. 
However, the concept of mental intuition appears (although under different names) 
throughout the history of Chinese thought as part of tradition which necessarily 
manifested itself in the perspective of a holistic comprehension of reality. In this 
context, any division of reality into the spheres of appearances and substance was 
seen as an artificial one, because both spheres were equally subject to direct 
perception. Thus, despite his originality, Mou’s philosophy could be defined as an 
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intercultural hybrid which is incapable of being coherently developed in either 
tradition. Despite this limitation, Mou Zongsan is still regarded as one of the most 
influential Chinese thinkers of the modern era by most Western sinologists and 
contemporary Chinese scholars alike.  
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